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Abstract
Several arguments have been proposed some years ago, attempt-
ing to prove the impossibility of defining Lorentz-invariant elements of
reality. Here I revisit that question, and bring a number of additional
considerations to it. I will first analyze Hardy’s argument, which was
meant to show that Lorentz-invariant elements of reality are indeed
inconsistent with quantum mechanics. I will then investigate to what
extent the light cone associated with an event can be used to define
Lorentz-invariant elements of reality. It turns out to be possible, but
elements of reality associated with a product of two commuting op-
erators will not always be equal to the product of elements of reality
associated with each operator. I will finally examine a number of ways
in which the paradoxical features of Hardy’s experiment can be better
understood.
1 Introduction
The notion of ‘element of reality’ was introduced in the famous Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) paper [1], as an attribute of a physical quantity
whose value can be predicted with certainty without disturbing the system.
To avoid the ambiguity of the phrase ‘without disturbing the system,’ Red-
head [2] later gave the following sufficient condition for the existence of an
element of reality, hereafter called ER1:
If we can predict with certainty, or at any rate with probability
one, the result of measuring a physical quantity at time t, then
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at the time t there exists an element of reality corresponding to
the physical quantity and having a value equal to the predicted
measurement result. [ER1]
Several interpretations of quantum mechanics involving various kinds of
elements of reality were proposed after the EPR paper, Bohmian mechanics
in particular [3]. Originally developed as nonrelativistic theories, they have
been notoriously difficult to reconcile with the special theory of relativity.
Eventually, the question was raised whether Lorentz-invariant elements of
reality are inconsistent with quantum mechanics [4, 5, 6].
In this paper I will first analyze Hardy’s argument, which was meant to
show that Lorentz-invariant elements of reality are indeed inconsistent with
quantum mechanics. I will then investigate to what extent the light cone
associated with an event can be used to define Lorentz-invariant elements
of reality. It turns out to be possible, but these elements of reality won’t
satisfy the so-called product rule, i.e. an element of reality associated with a
product of two commuting operators will not always be equal to the product
of elements of reality associated with each operator [7, 8]. I will finally ex-
amine how, in several interpretations of quantum mechanics, the paradoxical
features of Hardy’s experiment can be better understood.
2 Hardy’s argument
Hardy’s gedanken experiment [4] is illustrated in Fig. 1. Two Mach-Zehnder-
type interferometers are set up, one for electrons (MZ−, lower right) and one
for positrons (MZ+, upper left). Electron (positron) states are prepared with
initial state vectors |s−〉 (|s+〉), which are wave packets concentrated around
paths s− (s+) indicated in Fig. 1. There is annihilation with unit probability
if the electron and positron wave packets meet at point P.
Beam splitters BS1± and BS2± act so that
|s±〉 → 1√
2
(i|u±〉+ |v±〉), (1)
|u±〉 → 1√
2
(|c±〉+ i|d±〉), (2)
|v±〉 → 1√
2
(i|c±〉+ |d±〉). (3)
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Figure 1: Hardy’s thought experiment with two Mach-Zehnder-type interfer-
ometers
State vectors |u±〉, |v±〉, |c±〉 and |d±〉 are wave packets concentrated around
associated paths in Fig. 1.
The evolution of the joint particles’ state vector is explained in Ref. [4],
from which we quote the following results. Henceforth |γ〉 represents photon
states resulting from electron-positron annihilation.
In any run of the experiment, there is a Lorentz frame F− in which the
electron wave packet has gone through BS2− before the positron wave packet
has reached BS2+. During that time, the state vector is given by:
1
2
√
2
(−
√
2|γ〉 − |u+〉|c−〉+ 2i|v+〉|c−〉+ i|u+〉|d−〉). (4)
Similarly, there is a Lorentz frame F+ in which the positron wave packet
has gone through BS2+ before the electron wave packet has reached BS2−.
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During that time, the state vector is given by:
1
2
√
2
(−
√
2|γ〉 − |c+〉|u−〉+ 2i|c+〉|v−〉+ i|d+〉|u−〉). (5)
Furthermore, before the positron wave packet has gone through BS2+ and the
electron wave packet has gone through BS2−, the state vector in all frames
is given by:
1
2
(− |γ〉+ i|u+〉|v−〉+ i|v+〉|u−〉+ |v+〉|v−〉). (6)
Finally, when both the electron and the positron wave packets have gone
through the second beam splitters, the state vector in all frames is given by
1
4
(− 2|γ〉 − 3|c+〉|c−〉+ i|c+〉|d−〉
+ i|d+〉|c−〉 − |d+〉|d−〉). (7)
To argue against relativistic elements of reality, Hardy proposes a suffi-
cient condition for their existence and a necessary condition for their Lorentz
invariance. The sufficient condition essentially coincides with Redhead’s
ER1. The necessary condition, hereafter called LI1, simply reads as:
The value of an element of reality corresponding to a Lorentz-
invariant observable is itself Lorentz invariant. [LI1]
I shall denote an element of reality associated with an observable A by f(A).
Whenever ER1 is satisfied for A, then f(A) coincides with an eigenvalue of
A, a real number.
Suppose that in frame F−, an electron is detected in D−. From Eq. (4),
one can predict with certainty that a measurement of the observable U+ =
|u+〉〈u+| will yield the value 1. Hence U+ is an element of reality, and
f(U+) = 1. Likewise suppose that in frame F+, a positron is detected in
D+. From Eq. (5), this implies that U− = |u−〉〈u−| is an element of reality,
and f(U−) = 1. According to Eq. (7), both these situations will occur
together, on average, in one of every sixteen runs. In any such case, LI1
implies that both U+ and U− are elements of reality. But Hardy claims that
f(U+)f(U−) = 1⇒ f(U+U−) = 1. (8)
4
Hence in every run where an electron is detected in D− and a positron is
detected in D+, we obtain that f(U+U−) = 1.
From Eq. (6), however, we can predict with certainty that a measurement
of the observable U+U− will yield the value 0. Thus f(U+U−) = 0, which
contradicts the result of the previous paragraph.
The upshot is that there seems to be no way to assign elements of reality
in a relativistically invariant way.
3 Analysis
I have argued elsewhere [9] that the inference made in (8) assumes that
ER1 is not only a sufficient, but also a necessary condition. This conclusion
is reinforced by the fact that variants of Hardy’s argument [6] assume the
validity of the product rule for commuting operators:
f(U+)f(U−) = f(U+U−). (9)
Indeed one can show [9] that any real-valued function f which (i) is defined on
a maximal set of commuting Hermitian operators, (ii) satisfies Eq. (9), and
(iii) is 1 on some but not all one-dimensional projectors in the set, singles
out a one-dimensional subspace of the state space, i.e. there is a unique
one-dimensional projector in the set on which f = 1. If the element of
reality that this function assigns is identified with an eigenvalue of a quantum
observable, then a unique state vector is singled out by the specification
that f = 1. Hence it leads to the most definite predictions that quantum
mechanics allows.
Since the contradiction obtained in Sec. 2 involves somewhat more than
the sufficient condition ER1 and the necessary condition LI1, one can ask
whether it is indeed possible to have Lorentz-invariant elements of reality.
To answer this question, let us first note that condition ER1 involves the
word ‘predict’ in an essential way. Since ‘predict’ refers to the future, i.e. to
times later than some instant t in a given Lorentz frame, ER1 is clearly not
a relativistically invariant criterion. To get an invariant criterion, we should
introduce an invariant specification, i.e. we should make use of the light cone.
I have shown in Ref. [9] that the backward light cone is not an appropriate
choice, because it does not capture the kind of elements of reality that EPR
had in mind. But the forward light cone is. So here’s what a relativistically
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invariant sufficient condition for the existence of an element of reality may
look like:
If from the (relevant) information on or outside the forward light
cone of a possible measurement event E , we can infer with cer-
tainty, or at any rate with probability one, the result of measuring
a physical quantity at E , then at that event there exists an ele-
ment of reality corresponding to the physical quantity and having
a value equal to the predicted measurement result. [ER3]
Criterion ER3 bears some relation to the Hellwig-Kraus approach [10]
to state vector collapse, of which I’ll say more in the next section. In that
approach, the collapse occurs on the backward light cone of the measurement
event. It therefore allows for relevant information obtained through collapse
to bear upon a measurement performed in its relative (though not absolute)
past, just like ER3 does.
To apply to Hardy’s argument, criterion ER3 should also be adapted to
nonlocal observables like U+U−. How can this be done? Fig. 2 shows two
light cones associated with U+ and U− respectively, or more precisely with
elements of reality pertaining to these observables at the events in dashed
boxes. We can combine the exteriors of the two light cones through their
union U (involving regions 1, 3 and 4) or their intersection I (involving only
region 4).
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Figure 2: Combination of two light cones
Suppose that we try to adapt criterion ER3 to U . It is clear that any
time an actual measurement of U+U− is performed, its result can be deduced
from information available in U , for this region includes part of the absolute
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future of the measurement events. Hence the criterion is in this case trivial.
(We’ll turn later to the case where the measurement is not performed.)
Suppose next that we try to adapt criterion ER3 to I. Consider as we
did before a run where detection occurs at D+ and D−. Since D− is outside
the forward light cone of U+, ER3 implies that f(U+) = 1. Likewise since
D+ is outside the forward light cone of U−, ER3 implies that f(U−) = 1.
This holds in all Lorentz frames.
It turns out, however, that neither D+ nor D− are in I, the intersection
of the regions outside the two forward light cones. Hence ER3 cannot be
used to deduce the existence of an element of reality associated with U+U−,
nor a fortiori to attribute a value to f(U+U−). Hardy’s argument therefore
no longer goes through, and the product rule (9) no longer necessarily holds.
We should note that criterion ER3 for the existence of elements of reality,
and its generalization to nonlocal observables through the region I, involve
context [5, 11]. Indeed the ‘relevant information’ is not the same for the local
observable U+ as it is for the nonlocal observable U+U−.
Vaidman [7, 8] has analyzed Hardy’s setup using the Aharonov, Bergmann
and Lebowitz rule [12], which evaluates the probability of measurement re-
sults conditional on postselection as well as preselection. He then found that
there is unit probability for the following three intermediate (unperformed)
results: (i) U+ yields 1; (ii) U− yields 1; and (iii) U+U− yields 0. In this
sense the product rule for elements of reality does not hold.
In Vaidman’s analysis, the value of the element of reality corresponding
to U+U− can be deduced from information in the union U of the regions
outside the two forward light cones of the events. As he claims, it thus
provides Lorentz-invariant elements of reality.
4 Understanding Hardy’s experiment
Hardy’s thought experiment, like many others in quantum mechanics, shows
paradoxical features related to correlations over spacelike separations. I have
argued elsewhere [13], following others [14], that interpreting quantum me-
chanics means answering the question, How can the world be for the theory
to be true? To attenuate, if not resolve, the paradoxical features of Hardy’s
setup, let us try to understand it in four different interpretations.
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4.1 Collapse theories
Hardy originally framed his argument against Lorentz-invariant elements of
reality in the language of state vector collapse. The argument, however, does
not depend on that assumption. Nevertheless, collapse theories do provide a
way to understand what happens in the experiment.
Assume as before that detectors D+ andD− eventually fire, at instants we
shall denote by t+ and t−. For simplicity, we also assume here that detectors
D± and C± are very close to the second beam splitters, so that the time
interval between splitting and detection is negligible.
In a nonrelativistic collapse theory such as von Neumann’s [15], collapse
occurs on an equal time hypersurface. Clearly, this singles out a preferred
reference frame, since equal time in one Lorentz frame is not equal time in
others.
Let us now consider two different cases. In the first one, the preferred
frame is the one where the two detections are simultaneous. Then for t <
t+ = t−, the state vector |ψ〉 is given by Eq. (6), whereas for t > t+ = t−,
it is given by |d+〉|d−〉. In the second case, the preferred frame is one where
detection at D+ occurs before detection at D−, i.e. t+ < t−. Then we have
|ψ〉 =


Eq. (6) if t < t+,
|d+〉|u−〉 if t+ < t < t−,
|d+〉|d−〉 if t− < t.
(10)
We can see that the observable U− is an element of reality in the second case,
but not in the first one. This just illustrates the lack of Lorentz invariance
of nonrelativistic collapse.
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Figure 3: Collapse in the Hellwig-Kraus theory
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The relativistic collapse theory of Hellwig and Krauss [10], applied to the
present situation, is illustrated in Fig. 3. In each of the four regions, the
state vector is given as follows:
|ψ〉 =


|d+〉|u−〉 in 1′,
|d+〉|d−〉 in 2′,
|u+〉|d−〉 in 3′,
Eq. (6) in 4′.
(11)
One can see that U− is an element of reality in region 1′, U+ is an element
of reality in 3′ and U+U− is an element of reality in 4′. These regions being
different, the product rule doesn’t hold.
4.2 Bohmian mechanics
In Bohmian mechanics, positions of particles are elements of reality. The
electron and the positron both follow deterministic trajectories in one arm
of their corresponding interferometers.
The trajectories, however, are not relativistically covariant. There is a
preferred frame where they are to be computed. If the preferred frame is the
one where both measurements are simultaneous, and detectors D+ and D−
fire, the trajectories can consistently avoid the u+u− path. If, on the other
hand, the preferred frame is the one where the positron is measured first,
then the state vector before the positron measurement is given by Eq. (6).
After measurement, it effectively becomes |d+〉|u−〉. The electron has gone
through u−, but one cannot say (as would presumably be found upon explicit
calculation) that the positron has gone through u+.
Bohmian elements of reality are Lorentz invariant, but condition ER1 is
not in general valid. That is, prediction with certainty in one frame is not
enough to ascertain the existence of an element of reality.
Note that in Bohmian mechanics, although particle trajectories are not
relativistically covariant, statistical predictions are, since they coincide with
the ones made by standard quantum mechanics.
4.3 Everett’s relative states
In Everett’s relative-states (or many-worlds) theory [16], the state vector
never collapses. All components of the final state vector (7) coexist. Different
9
variants of Everett’s approach will take the coexistence to apply to different
worlds, different minds or different decohering sectors of the state vector.
In a world (say) associated with the |d+〉|d−〉 component of state vec-
tor (7), detectors D+ and D− fire. Elements of reality can be associated
with |d+〉〈d+| and |d−〉〈d−| only in such worlds. In other worlds just as real
as these, however, detectors D+ and C− fire. Elements of reality can there
be associated with |d+〉〈d+| and |c−〉〈c−|.
In Everett’s theory, ER1 is not a sufficient condition for the existence of
an element of reality. If D− fires in frame F−, state vector (4) cannot in
general be used to attribute an element of reality to |u+〉〈u+|. To do so, one
would need to put detectors in paths v+ and u+, in addition to detectors D−
and C−. In that case the various terms of (4) would correspond to different
worlds. In all worlds where D− would fire, the detector in u+ would too.
Everett’s theory is relativistically covariant. In any reference frame, the
positron observer and the electron observer, if they eventually come close
along a timelike path, will always find themselves with the proper correla-
tions.
4.4 Cramer’s transactional view
In Cramer’s transactional interpretation [17], the electron-positron source
emits a (retarded) offer wave while various detectors (including the gamma-
ray detectors registering electron-positron annihilation) respond with (ad-
vanced) confirmation waves. This is reminiscent of Wheeler-Feynman elec-
trodynamics.
Eventually a transaction is established between the source and one de-
tector for each particle. The transaction involves the actual (as opposed
to counterfactual) configuration of the measuring devices. Counterfactual
reasoning cannot lead to an inference of elements of reality.
The process is relativistically covariant. No element of reality is attached
to a trajectory or partial state vector independently of a transaction.
5 Conclusion
In quantum mechanics, elements of reality are not easy to reconcile with
Lorentz invariance. We have seen that they can if the product rule is aban-
doned. Different interpretations of quantum mechanics may or may not as-
10
sign elements of reality, and if they do they may do so differently. It is the
present author’s contention, however, that the existence of various possible
ways to do so illuminates our understanding of quantum mechanics.
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